What Basic Emotions Really Are: Encapsulated or Integrated? by Wiegman, Isaac
What Basic Emotions Really Are  
Encapsulated or Integrated?  
Abstract: While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions (BEs) and 
about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that 
BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the 
products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this 
assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that 
evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications 
of these claims for debates about the existence of basic emotions in humans. 
1. Introduction 
It is widely held among emotion theorists that there is some theoretically interesting 
distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. On this picture, basic emotions 
(BEs) are primarily structured by evolution whereas higher cognitive emotions are 
substantially structured by either culture or individual experience. While there is ongoing 
debate about the existence of BEs and about their status as natural kinds, these debates 
usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that 
encapsulation is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products 
of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumptions is entirely unwarranted, that 
there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to 
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expect that cognitive encapsulation marks the distinction between basic and higher cognitive 
emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications of these claims for the existence of basic 
emotions in humans.  
In the following section, I characterize the received view of BEs, which holds (among 
other things) that BEs are solutions to basic life problems in our evolutionary past. Then I 
consider and reject some of the reasons to think that BEs are cognitively encapsulated. In the 
second section, I provide an example of a BE in rodents that bears the marks of cognitive 
integration (as opposed to encapsulation). The basic life problem that likely shaped this 
emotion appears to demand substantial cognitive integration. In the third section, I draw out 
the implications for a current debate in emotion theory concerning the existence of BEs in 
humans.  
2. Basic Emotions 
BEs – including anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise (for an extended list, 
see Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) – are thought to be human-typical behavioral syndromes that 
include involuntary facial expressions of emotion, physiological changes (e.g. in heart rate, 
blood pressure, and hormone levels), and changes in bodily posture (including bodily social 
displays and orienting responses). According to BE theory, these syndromes have a similar 
kind of evolutionary explanation and similar neural and psychological mechanisms.  
Specifically, they each evolved to address basic life problems or adaptive problems (such as 
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resource competition, avoidance of predators and avoidance of poisons and parasites). Some 
of these basic life problems are ones that we share with non-human animals.  
Moreover, the elicitation and production of these syndromes (including the 
coordination of various response components) are supposed to be explained by automatic 
appraisal mechanisms and affect programs, respectively (Ekman, 1977, 1999). For instance, 
affect programs explain phenomena observed in experiments that ask people to distinguish 
photographs of facial expressions of emotions, connect these expressions with emotion 
terms, or rate their appropriateness in response to vignettes (for an overview, see Ekman, 
2003). They are also supposed to explain the results of experiments that connect facial 
expressions with changes in physiological response components (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). To generalize, affect programs are 
introduced to explain the observed coordination of various response components and the 
cross-cultural production of these various syndromes (which is thought to explain widespread 
recognition of facial expressions across cultures). 
3. Unwarranted Assumptions Concerning Cognitive Integration 
Many emotion theorists claim that BEs lack cognitive integration. In this section, I argue that 
these claims are based on unwarranted assumptions.  
Assumption 1: Cognitively Integrated only if Informationally Integrated 
In most cases, questions about the integration of emotions with cognition concern the 
possibility that emotions are modular in Fodor’s (1983) sense. This depends (among other 
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things) on whether they can store information that cognitive systems cannot access 
(informational encapsulation); or whether information from other cognitive systems can 
interfere with the operations of an emotion (cognitive penetrability); or whether people have 
conscious access to emotional processes or merely their outputs (opacity); or whether the 
information that an emotion provides is general as opposed to specific (which would imply 
shallow outputs). These are some of the more well-known marks of cognitive integration or 
its absence, encapsulation. 
Philosophers and psychologists alike usually proceed under the assumption that 
integration with cognition depends entirely on whether information is integrated in these 
ways. These assumptions translate to discussions about BEs, where evidence for lack of 
informational integration is sometimes used as evidence for lack of cognitive integration 
simpliciter: 
Three other types of evidence suggest that [basic] emotion processes can operate 
independently of cognition. Emotions have been induced by unanticipated pain…, 
manipulation of facial expressions…, and changing the temperature of cerebral blood… 
In all these conditions the immediate cause of the emotion was noncognitive. (Izard, 
1992, p. 563, see also his 2007) 
Here, Izard apparently assumes that the impenetrability of BEs constitutes evidence that BEs 
operate independently of cognition. The fact that they respond to low level inputs or 
processes to which other systems have limited access certainly suggests that emotional states 
can respond to information that is not integrated with cognition. In addition, there is evidence 
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that people cannot fully control facial expressions of BEs (Ekman, 1972; Friesen, 1973), 
suggesting that BEs are cognitively impenetrable. Overall, BEs appear to lack informational 
integration. 
Nevertheless, the realm of the cognitive picks out not only informational states, but 
also includes a broader range of internal states that function as causal intermediates between 
stimulus and response, perception and action (Rey, 1997). Cognitive states so understood 
include not only informational states (such as beliefs) but also motivational states (such as 
desires). Moreover, questions about cognitive integration may be asked about either 
informational or motivational states. If so, the possibility arises that the two forms of 
cognitive integration are independent of one another. If so, any inference from the one to the 
other is invalid.  
This becomes clear when we consider hunger. Hunger may very well be akin to 
desire (a paradigmatic case of a cognitively integrated state) in the sense that it can interact 
with other cognitive systems to produce flexible or novel behaviors, as when rodents take 
novel “short cuts” to get to a food box in a maze (Olton, 1979; Tolman, 1948). Short cut 
behaviors suggest that hunger is a motivational state that can incline rodents to the pursuit of 
an end (e.g. food consumption) by selecting from a range of different means, perhaps by 
interacting with informational states that relate means to ends (e.g. means-ends beliefs). Even 
so, hunger may be cognitively impenetrable in that it may be triggered by low level stimuli 
and processes (e.g. low-level detection of changes in blood sugar). Moreover, when one feels 
hungry, one cannot interfere with the feeling of hunger by thinking about it (e.g. by noticing 
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that the amount of energy one’s body has stored in fat deposits is more than enough to 
sustain oneself). One can even imagine that it is informationally encapsulated: it might store 
information (e.g. about which foods are more calorically dense) that other systems cannot 
directly access. 
These conceptual possibilities suggest that questions concerning the integration of 
informational states are conceptually independent of questions concerning the integration of 
motivational states. Hunger may be informationally encapsulated while retaining a degree of 
integration as a motivational state. Wholesale encapsulation, therefore, does not follow from 
informational encapsulation. If this is correct, then inferences like the one Izard draws above 
are invalid: having non-cognitive inputs is not a reason to think that emotions operate 
independently of cognition. They might very well operate in concert with cognition on the 
output side or as motivational states. Before I raise that possibility, consider another reason to 
rule it out at the outset: that BEs are not integrated with propositional attitudes, including 
beliefs and desires. 
Assumption 2: Integration with Beliefs and Desires is the Criterion for Cognitive 
Integration  
Contrary to the previous assumption, this one respects the distinction between motivational 
and informational integration. Nevertheless, I argue that it sets the bar for cognitive 
integration too high. 
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To see this, consider Griffiths’ (Griffiths, 1997, 2004) views on the distinction 
between basic and higher cognitive emotions. First, he draws on some of the same evidence 
as Izard to conclude that BEs are opaque and informationally encapsulated. Since they have 
these and other marks of modularity, Griffiths thinks BEs have “limited involvement” with 
higher cognitive processes, which are “…the processes in which people use the information 
of the sort they verbally assent to (traditional beliefs) and the goals they can be brought to 
recognize (traditional desires) to guide relatively long-term action and to solve theoretical 
problems.” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 92) Here, Griffiths may be making the same faulty assumption 
as Izard (that informational encapsulation implies cognitive encapsulation more broadly). 
However, let us grant that he may have additional reasons to think that emotions are not 
integrated on the output side or qua motivational states.  
From this, Griffiths draws a broader conclusion: that BEs are not “flexible [or] 
integrated with long-term, planned action” and are instead “restricted to short-term, 
stereotyped responses” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 241). The apparent assumption is that if BEs are 
not integrated with beliefs, desires and long-term planning, then the only alternative is that 
they are similar to fixed action patterns, being inflexible and stereotyped. Griffiths makes no 
explicit argument for this assumption, perhaps at the time it was widespread enough to make 
further argument otiose. 
Nevertheless, it has become a tendentious assumption for several reasons. First, the 
phenomena of intelligent action are much broader than deliberate, “long-term, planned 
action” mediated by beliefs and desires. For instance, Ginet (1990) argues that many clear 
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cases of actions (as distinct from mere behaviors, such as reflexes or fixed action patterns) 
are not plausibly mediated by conscious beliefs, desires or intentions: involuntarily crossing 
one’s legs, kicking a door in anger, impulsively pulling a loose thread from one’s clothes, 
and slamming on the brakes to avoid hitting a dog. These actions are not mere behaviors or 
reflexes. That is, they appear to be purposive and guided by the agent, but it is difficult to 
find belief-desire style explanations that render them intelligible.1 Why not think that BEs 
can influence actions more akin to this variety than to “long-term, planned actions”? Griffiths 
never raises this question, neither does he give reason to rule out the possibility that BEs 
cause actions intermediate between long-term planned action and stereotyped behavioral 
responses. 
Second, if we ask what might explain the other varieties of action that Ginet picks 
out, it may be that such actions are guided by other representational states, aside from 
conscious or verbally reportable beliefs, desires and intentions. For instance, in the last 
twenty years, cognitive scientists have begun to emphasize the role of unconscious or non-
conceptual representational states in generating flexible and intelligent behavior (Bermúdez, 
2003). Informational states aside from beliefs include perceptual representations, map-like 
spatial representations and representations of affordances. Motivational states aside from 
desires include drives, incentives and feedback mechanisms.  
                                                     
1 See also Hursthouse (1991). 
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The flexibility and intelligence of these representational states becomes clear when 
we consider animal behavior. Nonhuman animals display forms of intelligent or purposive or 
instrumental behavior (see e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998), even while lacking 
linguistically mediated propositional attitudes. This suggests that instrumental behaviors in 
non-human animals are underwritten by a different form of cognitive integration. Consider 
what Susan Hurley calls holistic flexibility: 
The holistic flexibility of intentional agency contributes a degree of generality to the 
agent’s skills: a given means can be transferred to a novel end, or a novel means adopted 
toward a given end. The end or goal functions as an intervening variable that organizes 
varying inputs and outputs and allows a degree of transfer across contexts. (Hurley, 2003, 
pp. 237–38) 
Where this sort of flexibility is found, it suggests that behavior is best explained with 
reference to informational states which represent the means available to an organism (e.g. 
affordances) and motivational states that represent its ends (e.g. drive states), which can 
interact interchangeably in order to bring about the same end by various means or to deploy a 
single means to bring about various ends.  
Nevertheless, these informational and motivational states may sometimes lack 
inferential integration with beliefs and desires. Even in humans, phenomena like “blind-
sight” suggest that perceptual representations can flexibly guide behavior without being 
integrated with verbally reportable states. That is, even though these perceptual states are not 
verbally reportable or consciously accessible, these informational states mediate goal-
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directed behaviors (e.g. putting a plate in a slot) rather than just reflexes and fixed action 
patterns (see e.g. Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991). All this suggests that Griffiths’ 
requirements on cognitive integration are too stringent. Verbal reportability and conscious 
accessibility of a representational state is not necessary for such a state to influence flexible 
behaviors. To my knowledge there is no evidence that BEs fail to meet less stringent 
requirements on cognitive integration such as holistic integration. 
Once the full range of representational states is expanded in this way (beyond beliefs 
and desires), it becomes possible that BEs have some degree of motivational integration with 
other representational states aside from conscious beliefs and desires to produce behaviors 
that are more flexible and purposive than stereotyped behaviors. Griffiths provides no reason 
to rule out this possibility.  
4. Evidence of Integration in a Basic Emotion 
In fact, there is some reason to rule it in. Consider the instinctive patterns of territorial 
behavior of rodents. These behaviors have been investigated in great detail using a resident-
intruder experimental paradigm (for an overview, see D. C. Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984, 
2003) add it Adams RRR) in which resident (who have occupied a cage or colony for a few 
weeks) will attack unfamiliar male intruders introduced into their cage. The attacks of the 
resident and the defensive maneuvers of the intruder comprise sets of stereotyped behaviors. 
Each attack behavior of the resident is paired with a matching defensive maneuver of the 
intruder. The resident adopts a set of stereotyped postures and attacks aimed at biting the 
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dorsal surfaces of the intruder. On the other hand, the intruder adopts a distinctive set of 
stereotyped behaviors aimed at avoiding or blocking the resident’s attempts to bite its back.  
While these behaviors are certainly stereotyped, they are not brittle or reflexive. For 
instance, attacks of residents vary depending on the defensive strategy adopted by the 
intruder, and they seem to be governed by a motive to approach and attack that persists the 
entire time that the intruder is present.  By contrast, the intruder rat’s whole suite of 
behaviors seems to be governed by a persistent motive to escape and avoid. 
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Figure 1 Confrontation and avoidance behaviors (e.g. facial expressions, postures and 
maneuvers) of resident and intruder mice (respectively). From Defensor and Corley (2012), 
p. 683 permission pending © Elsevier. Originally published in Physiology and Behavior. 
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What scientists have discovered about these behaviors (the flexibility of these 
behaviors and their coherent aims) indicates that they are produced by two underlying 
motivational systems, what I call the confrontation and avoidance systems (D. C. Blanchard 
& Blanchard, 1984, 2003; D. C. Blanchard, Litvin, Pentkowski, & Blanchard, 2009). The 
confrontation system is tuned to bring about a specific end state, repeated back-biting. 
Moreover, this motive does not depend on learning: rats which have been socially isolated 
from birth will still attempt to bite the back of an intruder (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1961). So far, the 
focus has been on cases in which a given rodent is purely motivated by confrontation or 
avoidance, but aggressive encounters in the wild usually involve a mix of offensive and 
defensive postures. This suggests that these motivational systems can be activated 
simultaneously or in close succession to produce mixed patterns of behavior. 
Regardless, these systems have many of the characteristics of affect programs in 
humans. They are posited to explain a coordinated suite of behaviors and physiological 
changes that may include facial expressions, cardiovascular changes, and endocrine 
responses (Defensor, Corley, Blanchard, & Blanchard, 2012; Fokkema, Koolhaas, & van der 
Gugten, 1995). Moreover, these systems are tailored to solve basic life problems. 
Specifically, the confrontation system solves the problem of defending territories from other 
males for breeding purposes (and without fatally injuring kin in the process), whereas the 
avoidance system solves the problem of avoiding occupied territories and failing that, 
defending against the attacks of residents. For these reasons, we have all the same reasons to 
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postulate BEs in rodent that we have in humans. Let us suppose then that the confrontation 
and avoidance systems are BEs in rodents.  
Interesting for my purposes, under certain conditions, the presence of the unfamiliar 
male can produce highly flexible and novel behaviors. In the bound-intruder task, an intruder 
is tied down on a Plexiglas plate with only its ventral surfaces (belly-side) exposed and 
placed in the cage of a resident, so that the resident cannot easily bite the back of the intruder. 
As a result, the resident will sometimes bite at the bands that tie down the intruder or dig 
under the intruder so that the resident can bite the intruder’s back (R. J. Blanchard, 
Blanchard, Takahashi, & Kelley, 1977). In contrast, none of these behaviors are adopted 
when the intruder is tied down with his back exposed.  
These instrumental behaviors are clearly not stereotyped forms of attack, rather they 
are forms of flexible behavior adjustment to achieve the aim of biting the intruder’s back: 
they exhibit holistic integration. In this case, the same end can be achieved by several, novel 
means. Attempts to bite the intruder’s bonds or to dig underneath the intruder are novel 
means toward the end of biting the back of the intruder. Moreover, some of a resident’s 
means can be deployed toward novel ends. Digging is an element of the rat’s behavioral 
repertoire that is ordinarily used for an entirely different purpose: constructing burrow 
systems for shelter and nesting (Boice, 1977). This suggests that there are informational 
states, representations of means (e.g. motor representations of digging, biting, lateral attack, 
etc.), that can interact interchangeably with motivational states, representations of various 
ends (e.g. nesting, back-biting, eating etc.), in order to produce flexible behaviors. 
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Importantly, the confrontation system seems to be involved in coordinating flexible 
back-biting behavior. Moreover, this is something we would predict if it is a solution to the 
basic life problem of defending a territory from intruders. Flexibility is required to 
successfully repel an intruder because it is not in the intruder’s best interest to be repelled 
easily or to act predictably. For instance, the intruder would be sure to fare poorly if it acted 
in a way that accommodates the attacks of the resident. So a single fixed action pattern or 
even a whole suite of fixed action patterns on the part of the resident would not tend to be 
successful against the most likely strategy of the intruder. It is more adaptive to have a 
flexible motivational state that leads to repeated back biting across a wide range of strategies 
or postures that the intruder might adopt. Rather than leading only to inflexible, stereotyped 
responses, it appears that solutions to basic life problems sometimes require some degree of 
motivational integration. 
 
5. Implications for Emotion Theory 
If we understand BEs in this way, this changes the shape of an ongoing debate in emotion 
theory concerning the existence of BEs in humans. In the past, this debate has carried on 
under the assumption that if an emotion is biologically basic, then one should predict that the 
various response components of the emotion will have a high degree of coherence; that for 
example “all instances of anger should have a characteristic facial display, cardiovascular 
pattern, and voluntary action that are coordinated in time and correlated in intensity.” 
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(Barrett, 2006, p. 29) This high degree of coherence is not observed across many emotions 
(Gentsch, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2013; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). For 
instance, when anger is elicited in experimental settings, it is uncommon to observe facial 
expressions in conjunction with the other putative components of BE anger.  
One way of defending the basicality of an emotion against this criticism is to reassess 
what patterns of emotional response are predicted by BE theory. As we saw in the section 
above the motivational component of a basic emotion can select novel, instrumental 
behaviors. Moreover, the motivational component can be indispensable for solving a basic 
life problem. I think we can add to this the possibility that other response components are not 
as indispensable as the motivational state. To see this, suppose that anger in humans is a 
solution to basic life problems of deterring conspecifics from challenges and insults. If so, it 
may be that the only reliable requirement of successful deterrence (at least in our lineage) is a 
flexible motivation to retaliate against perceived wrongs (e.g. McCullough, Kurzban, & 
Tabak, 2012). For instance, a reliable disposition to garner a reputation for revenge (e.g. by 
avenging personal offenses) appears to be a highly reliable strategy for deterrence (e.g. Daly 
& Wilson, 1988; Frank, 1988), perhaps more so than any facial expression or physiological 
responses. If revenge can be served cold, then anger may not always require anything more 
than a motivation to avenge. If so, then we might expect that the only reliably occurring 
component of anger is the relevant motivational state. But if this is correct, then evidence of 
low coherence is not evidence against the existence of BE anger. While this is a just-so story 
that may or may not end up being true, it shows that the expected level of coherence in a BE 
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depends on which basic life problem shaped that emotion. In some cases, we might expect 
the motivational state to be the only component that does not significantly vary across the 
situations in which these problems arise. In that case, contextually variable responses will be 
the norm rather than the exception. 
 
6. Conclusion: What Basic Emotions Really Are 
So what are basic emotions? Like other theoretical terms, part of the theoretical function of 
basic emotions is to place selective stress on competing theories (e.g. Kroon, 1985). In this 
case, BEs and competing conceptions of emotion allow us to discriminate between 
evolutionary theories of emotion in competition with radical social constructivist theories 
(e.g. Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013).  
BEs help distinguish these theories by specifying an architecture for emotion 
production predicted by evolutionary considerations. The distinguishing factor is whether 
emotion production is categorical or dimensional (see figure 2). If each BE is a solution to a 
different basic life problem, then when a BE is elicited, we should see emotional responses 
that are relevant to that basic life problem and distinct from the responses manifested by 
other BEs. Emotion production is categorical in the sense that the behavioral responses are 
controlled by a single emotional state (as distinct from other emotional states that might 
control a distinct pattern of response). By contrast, if all emotions are socially constructed as 
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some theorists claim, we might expect to see emotional behaviors controlled directly by 
multiple dimensions of appraisal (as in the bottom half of figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Competing architectures for emotion production. Top diagram is a categorical 
architecture, whereas the bottom is dimensional. From Moors (2012), p. 266 permission 
pending © John Benjamins Publishing Company. Originally published in Zachar and Ellis 
(2012). 
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Until the present, contextual variability of emotional responses has played a decisive 
role in distinguishing between these two architectures for emotion production. If flexible 
motivational states are not included among the components of BEs, then discrete emotion 
production predicts insensitivity to context subsequent to elicitation (though emotion 
regulation processes can perhaps inhibit or augment emotional responses according to 
context). However, once flexible motivational states are possible, categorical emotion 
production is compatible with a greater amount of contextual variability. 
Admittedly, this added complexity makes it more difficult to test whether humans 
have BEs. Nevertheless, it is not impossible. For instance, in the case of anger, researchers 
have developed a neurological measure of approach motivation (for a review, see Carver & 
Harmon-jones, 2009). If this motivational state is a component of anger, we can measure 
whether approach motivation itself is better predicted by contextual variables subsequent to 
anger elicitation or rather by contextual variables prior to or during elicitation. If contextual 
variables prior to elicitation do not independently predict approach motivation as BE theory 
might lead us to expect, then we would have evidence against the existence of BE anger. 
I have argued against prevailing assumptions that BEs lack cognitive integration. In 
the past, evidence against cognitive integration has been concerned with informational 
integration, and motivational integration has not been considered. Moreover, the assumed 
requirements for integration concern interaction with verbally reportable or consciously 
accessible states, and integration with other representational states is ignored. Moreover, BEs 
in rodents exhibit a form of motivational integration that plausibly hinges on interaction with 
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a wider variety of representational states. Properly understood, BEs are more likely to refer to 
emotional states in humans.  
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